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The Common Thread in 




“We see and understand things not as they 
are but as we are.” ~Anthony de Mello—
Awareness (1990)
Christian mystic Anthony de Mello illustrates 
today’s postmodern view of reality. He seems to 
say that truth and reality are autonomous, sub-
jective constructions in the eye of the beholder. 
Thus, Truth claims cannot be judged as true in 
all contexts for all times but are relative to some 
frame of reference like personal perception, lan-
guage, or culture. 
The idea that subjectivity influences the way 
we interpret the world is not new; neither is the 
idea that subjective factors influence the meth-
ods, discoveries, and applications of human col-
lective efforts. Over the last half-century, the 
bastion of objective reason has been crumbling at 
its Enlightenment foundation. Fatal blows have 
come from insights in psychology and the phi-
losophy of science. Although modern positivis-
tic science has been mortally wounded, I believe 
an integrative approach can be taken between a 
strong relativistic position on truth and an abso-
lutist one. The Christian faith as a worldview le-
gitimizes the assertion that there is a “real world” 
as well as the belief that we perceive it through 
interpretive lenses, which I will be calling “inter-
pretive frameworks.” These frameworks can yield 
a plurality of views, including imperfect ones. 
The goal of this paper is to explore the con-
flict between the relativistic and absolutist posi-
tions on truth, using insights from cognitive psy-
chology, philosophy of science, and Christianity. 
First, I will highlight how subjectivity takes 
place at the level of the individual, as described 
by schema theory. Second, I will show that the 
same cognitive process lies at the heart of human 
social efforts via shared interpretive frameworks 
often called “paradigms.” And third, I will ad-
dress the glaring implication of such subjectiv-
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ity. If individuals and groups interpret the world 
via their own subjective frameworks, the result is 
relativism, which is antithetical to objective ab-
solute truth that stands firm across all times and 
contexts. I will argue that Christian worldview 
philosophy helps resolve the apparent conflict 
based upon the biblical insight that the way we 
see and understand real-
ity stems ultimately from 
the condition of our heart. 
Interpretive frameworks 
are fundamental to human 
nature, and embracing 
their role in human func-
tioning poses no threat to 




 At the heart of schema theory is the relative 
nature of human sensory perception. The claim 
that the process of perception is not an exact 
match of the original sensation from the external 
world originates with Immanuel Kant.1 This idea 
was given experimental support in the late 1800s 
by the founder of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, 
who researched psychophysics in Germany.2 For 
example, I use this demonstration to illustrate 
how perception is relative. I place two buckets of 
water in front of the class, one with ice. I ask a 
volunteer willing to get his or her hand wet, to 
rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, the temperature of the 
bucket without ice. This contains cold tap water, 
and the student usually rates it as a 3 or 4. Next, 
I have the student rate the ice water—using the 
same hand—which usually receives an emphatic 
rating of 1! I then instruct the student to quickly 
put his or her hand back into first bucket and rate 
the water anew. The student surprisingly says, “It 
feels like a 6 or 7.” This response reveals that per-
ception is relative and is more dependent upon 
the current skin temperature than upon the tem-
perature of the stimulus. The point is that, at an 
individual level, we are bound by an interpreta-
tion process that is relative to individual experi-
ence.
Over the years this idea has been used to ex-
plain a variety of phenomena—especially in 
memory research and cognitive development. The 
result has been a theory explaining that subjective 
interpretive frameworks are used to see and under-
stand the world. Today we call this theory “sche-
ma theory,” the name originating from Kant.3 
Over the last century, key European psycholo-
gists, including Frederick 
Bartlett and Jean Piaget, 
have articulated and ap-
plied this idea. Bartlett con-
cluded that memory is a re-
construction of interaction 
with the environment that 
involves pre-set schemata 
or frameworks that guide 
both memory storage and 
recall.4 Piaget took the idea 
of interpretive frameworks 
beyond memory processing and articulated an en-
tire theory of cognitive development based upon 
their role in organizing all experience.5 
When the “cognitive revolution” took place 
in American psychology in the late 1960s,6  the 
mantle was taken up by many, including Ulrich 
Neisser, who speculated that mental cognitive 
schemata result from actual physical processes in 
the nervous system.7
Schema theory has even been explanatory in 
the research areas of artificial intelligence, neural 
network theory, and neuroscience, by theorists 
including Michael Arbib.8 Arbib believes that 
schema theory is the best explanation for going 
beyond the structure of the brain to an under-
standing of the function of it.9 
In recent decades, many researchers have con-
firmed that schemata serve as frameworks that 
guide interpretation. This confirmation has been 
shown in domains such as story recall,10 text com-
prehension, and speed of recall,11 linguistics,12 
visual learning,13 cultural differences in cogni-
tion,14 computational cognition,15 and problem 
solving16 and has been applied widely in various 
disciplines, including education.17
The work by Wundt, Bartlett, Piaget, Neisser 
and Arbib shows how our cognition is an inher-
ently subjective process. It is the interplay of an 
individual’s sensation and perception and the re-
Although modern positivistic 
science has been mortally 
wounded, I believe an 
integrative approach can 
be taken between a strong 
relativistic position on truth 
and an absolutist one. 
16     Pro Rege—March 2018
ality of his or her environment. However, the role 
of interpretive frameworks does not end here at 
the individual level, but it extends to how mean-
ing is shared and understood collectively. The 
same cognitive process lies at the core of human 
social efforts. Shared interpretive frameworks 
function in ways that yield collective subjectivity.
Collective Subjectivity
Humans are social creatures, dependent upon 
the structures of family, society, and culture. 
Given this social dependency, it makes sense that 
the use of interpretive frameworks would have a 
social counterpart seen in groups.
The idea was anticipated first in the 1930s by 
Lev Vygotsky’s sociocultural view of cognition. 
Vygotsky claimed inter-dependence between 
individual cognition and the social context in 
which it takes place.18 This view, that a type of 
collective interpretive framework guides group or 
social functioning, has been articulated in disci-
plines beyond the social sciences, most notably in 
the history and philosophy of science. 
Over the last half-century, much investiga-
tion has looked at the social structure of science. 
The findings have underscored the role of sub-
jectivity in scientific activity, in contrast to the 
modernist mindset, which sees science as a purely 
objective endeavor. The overarching consensus of 
this work has been that groups of scientists func-
tion under a type of conceptual structure that 
orients their work. This structure is subject to 
non-science-related influences, such as aesthetics, 
persuasion, and personalities. Although there is 
controversy as to who should get credit for the 
originality of some of his concepts,19 none can 
deny that Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions20 has been one of the most 
important works published on the topic in the 
last half-century.21 
Human Science Guided by Paradigms
Kuhn articulated a new way for understand-
ing scientific progress. He argued that a linear 
progression of discovery upon discovery—ac-
cumulating objective knowledge—was insuffi-
cient for describing how science actually works. 
He proposed a model describing science as un-
predictable and irregular. Rather than a vertical, 
linear process, he suggested more of a horizontal 
one of skips and jumps within a single plane, mo-
tivated not by anything objective but by subjec-
tive, socially-driven factors, such as personality, 
prestige, and aesthetics. He even used the reli-
gious term of “faith” and the metaphor of “con-
version” to describe how an individual scientist 
jumps allegiance from one view to another. 
Kuhn’s basic concept for describing science 
centers on the notion of a paradigm. A para-
digm is a collective conceptual framework that 
includes a complicated mixture of assumptions, 
theories, and hypotheses accepted by the group 
that establish a type of unconscious perimeter 
within which scientific investigation takes place. 
Progress is better seen as growth in depth rather 
than growth in breadth. Science is like digging 
a well straight down within a defined perimeter.
Although not always known by those work-
ing in it, the perimeter of the paradigm is limit-
ed. Nature, however, is not so limited; therefore, 
some discoveries do not fit within the boundar-
ies of the tight-knit paradigm. Someone digging 
near the edge may accidentally dig beyond the 
boundary. Kuhn calls such findings “anomalies.” 
They are often ignored and swept under the rug 
by those who discover them—unless they recur 
enough to create a crisis within the paradigm: a 
state of tension for anomalies that can no longer 
be ignored. When the paradigm can no longer 
provide a comprehensive explanatory framework, 
that paradigm must give way to another para-
digm in order to accommodate the new data. 
This giving way shifts the discipline to a com-
pletely different and seemingly incompatible 
paradigm. Kuhn calls this change a “paradigm 
shift,” or a “revolution”—a process of demolition 
and reconstruction—in contrast to the tradition-
al modernist view of gradual, vertical, linear, and 
harmonious progress.
Kuhn points to a gestalt switch (like a 3D 
Necker cube drawing) as an analogy to describe 
this process, where a single set of data can be 
perceived in two completely different ways—but 
only one way at a time. Kuhn’s description un-
derscores the idea that humans are subjective in 
their collective interpretation of even scientific 
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facts, guided by a collective interpretive frame-
work. 
Frameworks Do Not Yield Relativism
So far, we have seen two similar descriptions 
of how humans understand and experience the 
world, both individually and collectively—via 
individual and shared interpretive frameworks: 
cognitive structures of belief and expectations 
that guide the interpretation of reality. Each de-
scription highlights subjectivity in contrast to the 
objectivity of traditional 
modernism. 
The subjective and non-
cumulative process dis-
cussed by Kuhn, and also 
by others such as Polanyi22 
in the 1960s, took direct 
aim at modernism’s objec-
tive impartiality and began, in part, to usher in 
post modernity. The knee-jerk reaction by many 
in science, as well as in Christianity, has been to 
resist the sea change to postmodernism. Some 
have critiqued this change as relativism and anti-
science.23 Christians have resisted such new ideas 
too because of the danger of runaway relativism. 
Such a view seems to undermine the Christian 
conviction of absolute truth’s flowing from an 
almighty sovereign God, who is objectively real.
Granted, the views presented allow for rela-
tive interpretation by individuals and groups, 
but I believe that neither should be classified as 
endorsing postmodern relativism, which denies 
the existence of absolute truth. Correctly under-
stood, interpretive frameworks, such as schemata 
and paradigms, are each quite compatible with 
objective, absolute reality. 
Schemata: Basis For Relativity?
Taking the ideas from cognitive psychology 
or philosophy of science to an extreme, we find 
that it does look like postmodern relativism. Yes, 
human perceptual systems “construct” an under-
standing of the world that does not always match 
reality. Yes, humans mentally construct schemata 
that guide perception. Yes, collective thinking or 
paradigms seem to be exclusively mind-depen-
dent and subjective—apart from the objective 
world. 
Looking closely, however, we find that nei-
ther view negates reality itself. Rather than see-
ing these conflicting paradigms as supporting the 
idea that reality is only in the eye of the beholder, 
we should conclude that the interpretation of re-
ality is what is in the eye of the beholder. This lat-
ter statement more clearly highlights the role of 
our imperfect perception and cognition as they 
interact with the real world, rather than claiming 
that reality itself is malleable.
Our view should be 
that a real world exists, 
and that experiences, based 
firmly in that real world, 
can nonetheless be inter-
preted and understood dif-
ferently, given the particu-
lar framework (i.e., schema 
or paradigm). John Searle articulates a similar 
view. He presents a satisfying alternative to the 
old modernist view as well as to the prevailing 
postmodern constructionist and deconstruction-
ist views, which both deny any ultimate real-
ity.24 Searle suggests that two types of facts ex-
ist: “brute” facts, which are independent of what 
humans think about them (such as that Mount 
Everest has snow), and “social” facts, which are 
humanly constructed and conceived individually 
or institutionally (such as a piece of paper is a $5 
bill). This position affirms that which cognitive 
schema theory and philosophers of science, like 
Kuhn, contend: that a true reality exists and that 
humans develop interpretive frameworks with 
which they interpret that reality.
Illusory Schema Conflict: 
When relativity is an illusion 
One important point to highlight is that 
sometimes what looks like relativism is only an 
illusion. Regarding the function of schemata as 
they guide individual understanding, I see two 
aspects of the process that can yield what I term 
“illusory schema conflict.” The first deals with 
multiple exemplars of a single concept, while the 
other draws attention to the possibility of mul-
tiple interpretations of a single exemplar.  
Let me illustrate the first with the tallest 
Correctly understood, 
interpretive frameworks, such 
as schemata and paradigms, 
are each quite compatible with 
objective, absolute reality.
18     Pro Rege—March 2018
mountain question. If I asked, “What is the tall-
est mountain on Earth?” most would say Mount 
Everest in Nepal and China—it stands over 
29,000 feet above sea level. However, is Mount 
Everest really the tallest mountain on Earth? If 
we invoke different schemata to define the con-
cept of “tallest mountain,” there can be a plural-
ity of correct answers: 
• Tallest from its base below sea level (un-
der water): Mauna Kea in Hawaii, 33,480 
feet.
• Tallest rising from ocean floor: Mount 
Lamlam, Guam, 37,820 feet from the 
Mariana Trench
• Tallest from center of the earth: Mount 
Chimborazo in Ecuador, over 20 million 
feet.
The use of different schemata underscores 
the role of definition and context. Interpersonal 
misunderstandings are often caused by this type 
of schema conflict. Two different interpretive 
frameworks are correctly used, but they come 
to disparate conclusions. These differences show 
that sometimes differences may be due not to 
whether someone is wrong or right but simply to 
the fact that more than one point of view is vi-
able. 
The second type of schema conflict occurs 
when differing schemata are derived honestly 
from a single exemplar. An illustration of this is 
the ancient parable from India about six blind 
men walking who encounter an obstacle in their 
path. As each reaches out to touch what is in his 
way, the six have an awful argument because 
none can agree on what it is. One says it’s a spear, 
another says it is a hose, while yet another claims 
it is a fan. The fourth declares it is a wall, but 
another claims it is a pillar, and the last is con-
vinced it is a rope with a brush on its end. What 
they have encountered? The moral derived is that 
there are many ways to describe an elephant and 
that individual perception is limited. Some argue 
that this parable illustrates relativity—that each 
man experienced his own truth, valid for him 
and not the others. However, I suggest a more 
cryptic meaning. Yes, each man’s framework was 
different from that of the others, but the six views 
actually come together to form a more complete 
whole. 
This way of looking at the story highlights 
a distinction between the two types of schema 
conflict. The first, illustrated by the mountain 
story, affirms the multiplicity of truth, mediated 
by context, while the elephant story shows that a 
grand truth may lie behind multiple interpreta-
tions. This latter example emphasizes how seem-
ingly differing views may actually come together 
to provide a more complete understanding. The 
apostle Paul makes a similar point in Romans 
and I Corinthians when he explains that al-
though there are many separate parts of the body, 
they function together as a whole.25 This princi-
ple applies not only to the physical body and the 
Church of Jesus Christ but also to human cogni-
tive function.
In both cases of illusory schema conflict, the 
conflict seems to reveal incompatible ways of un-
derstanding when, in actuality, the conflicting 
schemata or views can be shown to be simultane-
ously totally true.
This raises the question of whether we, indi-
vidually or collectively, are capable of seeing be-
yond our own interpretive frameworks to perceive 
the whole. No doubt, this perception of the whole 
might be possible, but probably not in all circum-
stances because we have been created with lim-
its: normative limits imposed simply by the fact 
that we are created creatures and by the intrusion 
and distortion of sin.26 Both types of limitations 
probably play a role in obstructing our view of the 
whole. I speculate that some portions of our lim-
ited view, specifically those due to the distortion 
of sin, are potentially fixable, or at least partially, 
via sanctification; but post-consummation, some 
of these limits will be entirely gone, and we will 
experience knowledge of the true-for-all-time, 
uber-framework.
An Uber-framework?
An uber-framework is the idea that there ex-
ists an overarching metanarrative that gives ulti-
mate meaning to varying and sometimes seem-
ingly disparate cultural and/or individual nar-
ratives. Several Christian scholars have argued 
for the existence of such a superior framework.27 
For example, Roy Clouser makes a case for an 
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for the existence of such a superior framework.27 
For example, Roy Clouser makes a case for an 
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overarching framework that subsumes both pure 
Aristotelian objectivity and Kantian subjectivity 
and provides a third alternative: that ultimate 
knowledge lies with God alone. Clouser suggests 
that there exists an overarching uber-framework, 
albeit in the mind of God alone, that subsumes 
all others.28
This idea has been articulated by many in the 
context of worldview philosophy, particularly by 
Christians who believe that in God lies ultimate 
truth, or the true worldview of worldviews—the 
uber-framework. In my 
judgment, the concept 
paradigm that we have 
described thus far in the 
context of the philosophy 
of science is identical in 
essence and function with 
the concept of worldview 
that has been articulated 
by many Christian phi-
losophers. 
Christian Worldview Philosophy
In David Naugle’s in-depth look at the con-
cept of worldview, he traces the idea of an over-
arching worldview that explains all reality—back 
to the Reformation writings of John Calvin and 
then, in the late 1800s, to Scottish theologian 
James Orr and Dutch theologian Abraham 
Kuyper.29 As the more well-known of these two, 
Kuyper’s version will be described briefly.
Kuyperian Worldview Philosophy
Kuyper is known for applying Calvinism to 
everyday life, focusing on the sovereignty of the 
God of the Bible over all aspects of reality: cos-
mos, culture and thought. Calvin believed that 
God revealed Himself to humans via the created 
order, as well as through the Bible, the infallible 
and inerrant words written under the influence of 
the Holy Spirit. Of these two revelations, Calvin 
gave priority to the Bible when he used the meta-
phor of the Scriptures being spectacles through 
which humans are to interpret and understand 
the rest of God’s creation.30 In other words, 
Calvin claimed that God, as sovereign creator 
of all things, is the ultimate source of all knowl-
edge and Truth and that the Bible is a direct filter 
for Truth. Kuyper believed that people can and 
should understand Christianity as a holistic and 
comprehensive philosophy of life rather than as 
just one compartmental aspect of human experi-
ence.31, 32 
This is where Kuyper highlights world-
view as a type of interpretive framework. The 
term itself is translated from the German word 
Weltanschauung, which means “a particular way 
of looking at the world.” The term originates 
with Kant, as we saw with 
the term schema.33 Since his 
time, it has come to mean 
a set of underlying assump-
tions that define the spirit 
of the age or the particular 
way a culture manifests it-
self in literature, art, philos-
ophy, and science. Kuyper 
used the term to suggest 
that multiple worldviews 
can co-exist and be in conflict with one another 
while competing for people’s allegiance.
In his day, Kuyper identified two oppos-
ing “faiths,” or worldviews, that were in direct 
conflict: modernism versus Christianity. Kuyper 
suggested that the conflict resulted ultimately 
from Adam and Eve’s fall in to sin. The Fall pro-
duced an antithesis, or tension between God and 
idolatry (or evil), that is manifested in all human 
endeavors. Relating this antithesis to science, for 
example, Naugle states, 
Kuyper argues [that]… regenerate people 
with a Christian worldview produce a … the-
istic interpretation of science, and non-regen-
erate people with a non-Christian worldview 
produce an idolatrous science …. Scientific 
reason is not the same for all people. It de-
pends upon whether or not the scientist has 
or has not been religiously renewed. There 
is not a neutral scientific rationality leading 
to certain objective and shared conclusions. 
Instead, scientific theories are a function of 
the religious backgrounds and philosophical 
orientations of the scientists or theorists.34 
It is important to point out that the conflict 
is not in the science itself but in the conclusions 
An uber-framework is the idea 
that there exists an overarching 
metanarrative that gives 
ultimate meaning to varying 
and sometimes seemingly 
disparate cultural and/or 
individual narratives.
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made (i.e., interpretation and application). 
Kuyper is basically arguing that collective 
interpretive frameworks function in society. 
His argument is similar to our earlier descrip-
tion of collective cognition as seemingly relative. 
But Kuyper’s Christian worldview philosophy is 
clearly based on a belief that there is a real creator, 
God, who is objectively manifest in the material 
creation as well as in the Bible. Both realms are 
objectively true. But seeming relativity comes 
into Kuyper’s thought when he claims that there 
are different interpretations of that reality: “ab-
normal” and “normal,” as he termed them.35 
Those who are regenerated by the power of God’s 
Holy Spirit are given a new outlook, which al-
lows them to understand that the cosmos is in 
an abnormal state due to sin and in need of re-
demption through Jesus Christ, but those who 
are unregenerate see all as normal and see the 
need for Christ as folly. The result is a difference 
in interpretation of a single reality, not a differ-
ence between two constructed realities that are 
mutually exclusive. 
One implication from Christian Worldview 
philosophy is that God’s reality is the uber-frame-
work—the true paradigm or schemata, the only 
correct interpretation—and that human access 
to the framework is only possible by regenera-
tion of the Holy Spirit. The reverse implication is 
that without God’s action, flawed frameworks or 
wrong schemata, paradigms, or worldviews exist, 
leading to framework errors at all levels. 
Another implication is that because the Holy 
Spirit’s regeneration focuses inwardly, we may 
need to consider that our interpretive frameworks 
are more than cognitive. Recently, some have be-
gun to critique36 the idea of worldview as a static, 
theoretical, and cognitive process and to direct 
us to see our interpretive frameworks as coming 
from the heart—which encompasses our identity 
more holistically.37 For example, Jamie Smith 
suggests that when talking about worldview, we 
need to move to a more non-cognitive, affective 
model, which includes our cares, concerns, mo-
tivations, and desires.38 Based upon insight from 
Esther Meek,39 Naugle argues that “the heart 
needs to be rooted in the physical body…and an-
chored in the ebb and flow of the real world,”40 
meaning that knowing with the heart, which is 
the center of human consciousness, involves the 
totality of our being. This is where our individual 
cognitive schemata intermingle with our collec-
tive paradigms and worldviews and guide us in 
holistic biological, psychological, and social con-
sciousness. 
Conclusion
The interpretive frameworks we have looked 
at (cognitive schemata, paradigms, and world-
views) seem to all function in a common way—
as filters to help us understand the world around 
us. This way of human perception seems to be by 
design. God created us to gain individual and so-
cial knowledge through interpretive frameworks. 
These frameworks provide a starting point as well 
as an important heuristic for our exploration and 
progress in fulfilling the cultural mandate.41 
One aspect of this design is clear: there are 
limitations. We are limited perceivers but will 
someday be freed from at least part of the limita-
tion. Human nature is restricted in that we are 
creatures created by God and, as such, will never 
apprehend fully the true uber-worldview, which 
is known by God alone. We all are affected by the 
distortion of sin, which implies that some of the 
subjectivity of our cognitive perceptions is due to 
sin. This distortion explains why errors happen at 
all levels of our interpretive frameworks. 
The Christian’s hope is that Christ’s redemp-
tive work of restoration will yield for us a more 
complete way of knowing at His second coming. 
As the apostle Paul said, “Now I know in part; 
then I shall know fully.” We have confidence that 
part of the limitation in our ability to know will 
be removed. 
Perhaps without sin’s effect upon our inter-
pretive frameworks, we may share a common 
perceptual organization, language, culture, para-
digm, and worldview. Having a shared interpre-
tive framework seems consistent with the bibli-
cal theme of restoration. Recall that the origin 
of multiple languages and culture groups came 
from God’s judgment of sin at the Tower of 
Babel. Perhaps God will bring “heart” and “cog-
nitive” unity to all the diverse nations who occu-
py the new Jerusalem by establishing a common 
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set of interpretive frameworks for all its citizens. 
The biblical narrative of creation, fall, redemp-
tion, and consummation is the human entrance 
into God’s true worldview, the uber-framework, 
where God’s people will know more fully, which 
may mean to know in the same way from percept 
to thought to culture. When that day arrives, we 
all, including Anthony de Mello, will no longer 
see and understand things as we were, but will 
see and understand them as God intended, as 
they truly are.
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